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This paper shows that tax reform techniques are well-suited to an examination
of the La⁄er argument, i.e., the possibility that an increase in a tax rate may reduce
tax revenues (and vice versa). Our methodology allows us to examine the La⁄er
argument directly, without deriving the La⁄er curve, which in turn allows us to
conduct the analysis in a very general setting. Despite the high level of generality,
we are able to reach some clear conclusions that provide formal support for the
established intuitions that the La⁄er e⁄ect requires: (i) a ￿ high￿labour-income tax
rate, and (ii) a ￿ large￿labour supply response to wage changes. The notions of
￿ high￿and ￿ large￿are made precise in our framework. The analysis also provides
indirect support for the intuition that it is never optimal for a government to
operate on the downward-sloping segment of the La⁄er curve. Finally, we show
that our methods provide a theoretical framework for an empirical investigation.
Keywords: La⁄er argument, tax reform.
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responsibility.1 Introduction
The possibility that an increase in a tax rate may actually decrease total tax receipts
(and vice versa) has featured prominently in many tax policy debates ever since Arthur
La⁄er famously drew his curve on a napkin in a Washington restaurant in the mid
1970s.1 Indeed, recent data indicating expanding tax revenues in the US despite the Bush
administration￿ s (controversial) 2003 tax cuts has breathed new life into the debate.2
The La⁄er argument is well known and quite simple: a tax rate of zero will (obviously)
yield zero tax receipts, while a tax rate of 100 percent will also yield zero tax receipts
as the private sector will not generate a tax base for no return. Thus an inverted U-
shaped curve is obtained in tax rate￿ tax revenue space, with tax revenues ￿rst increasing
in the tax rate, reaching a peak, and then decreasing to reach zero at a tax rate of
100 percent. The increasing portion of the curve is known as the ￿ normal￿segment,
while the decreasing portion is known as the ￿ prohibitive￿segment. Tax policy debates
revolve around whether the economy is currently thought to be situated on the normal
or prohibitive segment.
Despite the fact that the La⁄er argument has received considerable attention from
politicians, journalists, and analysts in the public domain, it has been subjected to
relatively little formal analysis. An early study by Fullerton [1982] estimates the La⁄er
curve for the US economy. Hansson and Stuart [2003] provide relatively recent estimates
of the peaks of La⁄er curves for a sample of OECD countries.3 These and other empirical
studies tend to be based on a simple analytical framework derived from some back-of-
an-envelope (it might be more apt to say back-of-a-napkin!) calculations that establish
a relationship between tax revenues, the labour-income tax rate, and the labour supply
1So the story goes, see Fullerton [1982].
2See, for example, the editorial in the Wall Street Journal, 19 June 2005. For an opposing view, see
Krugman, New York Times, 11 July 2005.
3Some other recent studies have, in e⁄ect, focused on the La⁄er argument indirectly by estimating
￿ taxable income elasticities￿ , i.e., how reported levels of taxable income respond to tax rate changes.
These estimates not only capture, for example, the labour supply response, but also capture possible
increased tax evasion and avoidance in response to tax rate hikes. See Gruber and Saez [2002], Carroll
and Hrung [2005], and Kopczuk [2005]. The estimated taxable income elasticity can then be used to
examine the La⁄er argument.
2elasticity. Put simply, tax revenues can be written as:
T = ￿wL($) (1.1)
where T is tax revenues, ￿ is the labour-income tax rate, w is the producer price of
labour, and L is labour supply as a function of the consumer wage $ = (1 ￿ ￿)w.





The La⁄er e⁄ect occurs when @T=@￿ < 0, which from (1.2) is when ￿wL0($) > L($).

















where the left-hand side of (1.4) is the labour supply elasticity. Based on something
like the simple analysis above, the canonical thinking is that the La⁄er e⁄ect requires a
high labour-income tax rate and/or a high labour supply elasticity, relative to observed
labour-income tax rates and generally accepted estimates of the labour supply elasticity.
For example, if the labour-income tax rate is 30 percent, based on (1.4) the La⁄er e⁄ect
would require a labour supply elasticity of at least 21
3. Empirical estimates of labour
supply elasticities are typically no greater than 0.5.4
In order to estimate empirical La⁄er curves, some restrictive assumptions regarding
preferences, technologies, and the nature of the economy must, of course, be made. In a
theoretical study, Malcomson [1986] uses a simple general equilibrium model with three
goods (one consumption good, one public good, and labour) and identical consumers.
4See Hansson and Stuart [2003].
3Assuming well-behaved functional forms (but not necessarily the speci￿c forms used in
empirical studies), Malcomson [1986] shows that the La⁄er curve may not be continuous
and may not reach an interior maximum. The curve can be increasing in the labour-
income tax rate until reaching a discontinuity at 100 percent, where tax receipts fall to
zero. In this case, there is no prohibitive segment of the La⁄er curve and there is no
La⁄er e⁄ect, except when the tax rate is increased to 100 percent. In a follow-up paper,
Gahvari [1989] shows that the discontinuity identi￿ed by Malcomson [1986] disappears
if government expenditures take the form of cash transfers to consumers, rather than
being used to provide a public good.
Guesnerie and Jerison [1991] generalise the theoretical analysis further still by using
a low-dimensional version (one consumption good, one public good, and labour) of the
classic Diamond and Mirrlees [1971] general equilibrium tax model. Unlike Malcomson
[1986] and Gahvari [1989], the model has heterogeneous consumers, although the public
good is assumed to be separable from the consumption good and labour in each con-
sumer￿ s utility function. Guesnerie and Jerison [1991] show that the La⁄er curve may
have multiple local maxima, and in some cases it may never slope downwards.5 They
also note that it is not clear if their results can be extended to a model with many
commodities, which gives some signi￿cance to their use of a simpli￿ed version of the
Diamond-Mirrlees model.
While the existing literature has used simple models and focused on the shape of the
La⁄er curve, in this paper we show that an unrestricted version of the Diamond-Mirrlees
model can be used by undertaking a tax reform style analysis of the La⁄er argument.
Tax reform analysis takes the existing tax system and its (possible) imperfections as its
starting point, and examines the conditions under which there exist small changes in
taxes that are equilibrium preserving and Pareto improving.6 We take a similar approach
to the examination of the La⁄er argument. Starting in an arbitrary tax equilibrium,
5Guesnerie and Jerison [1991] also address the normative question of how relevant the La⁄er argu-
ment is for social choice amongst tax equilibria.
6Tax reform therefore di⁄ers from optimal tax analysis, which pays no attention to the existing tax
system and implicitly assumes that the government is free to implement large changes in taxes to obtain
an optimum. The tax reform approach was pioneered by Guesnerie [1977], and developed further by
Diewert [1978] and Weymark [1979]. For a good textbook treatment, see chapter 6 in Myles [1995].
4we characterise the conditions under which a small increase in the labour-income tax
rate necessarily results in lower tax revenues.7 Thus, we can directly examine the La⁄er
argument without deriving the La⁄er curve, which requires consideration of large changes
in taxes. As we do not derive the La⁄er curve, we cannot say anything about its
shape. However, if the conditions for the La⁄er e⁄ect to occur are satis￿ed, then roughly
speaking it could be said that the economy is situated on the prohibitive segment of the
La⁄er curve.
Despite the model￿ s high level of generality and our methodology being unlike any-
thing in the related literature, we are able to obtain some clear conclusions that happen
to support current thinking about the La⁄er argument, speci￿cally:
￿ If the status quo tax system is Pareto e¢ cient, an increase in the labour-income
tax rate cannot result in the La⁄er e⁄ect;
￿ The labour-income tax rate must be ￿ high￿in an economy that is subject to the
La⁄er e⁄ect;
￿ Labour supply must be ￿ very sensitive￿to changes in wages in an economy that is
subject to the La⁄er e⁄ect.
Moreover, we are able to:
￿ Give precise meaning to the notions that the labour-income tax rate must be ￿ high￿
and that labour supply must be ￿ very sensitive￿to changes in wages;
￿ Characterise precisely what an economy must ￿ look like￿if the La⁄er e⁄ect is to
occur, where the characterisation exercise provides a theoretical framework for an
empirical investigation into the possibility of the La⁄er e⁄ect in real economies.
A recent literature, e.g., Agell and Persson [2001] and Novales and Ruiz [2002], has
used endogenous growth models to examine if the La⁄er e⁄ect is more likely to occur
in the longer run. Our aims are in the same spirit, in the sense that we are interested
7In the concluding section we discuss some problems that arise if an attempt is made to characterise
when a decrease in the labour-income tax rate increases tax revenues.
5in how the La⁄er argument is a⁄ected by changes in models and modelling techniques.
Our analysis is also related to a recent literature that uses tax reform techniques to
revisit fundamental questions in the theory of taxation. For example, Fleurbaey [2006]
uses tax reform techniques to re-examine the desirability of consumption versus income
taxation. Tax reform techniques have also been used by Murty and Russell [2005] to
analyse externalities, and by Krause [2007] to analyse the incidence of capital taxation.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the model,
while Section 3 discusses the tax reform methodology we employ and presents the results.
Section 4 presents a numerical example of an economy that is subject to the La⁄er e⁄ect,
which illustrates how one would apply our methodology to test the La⁄er argument in
real economies. Section 5 contains some concluding comments, while proofs and many
of the mathematical details are relegated to an appendix.
2 The Model
The economy has k consumers, indexed by i = 1, ..., k. Consumer i chooses his (net of




fUi(xi;li;g) j qxi ￿ !lig (2.1)
where Vi(￿) is the indirect utility function, Ui(￿) is the direct utility function with rxiUi(￿)
￿ 0(n); rliUi(￿) < 0, and rgUi(￿) > 0 where g is a public good provided by the gov-
ernment.9 The consumer price vector corresponding to the commodities is q = p +
t, where p is the producer price vector corresponding to the commodities and t is a
vector of speci￿c commodity taxes. The consumer wage is ! = w ￿￿, where w is the
producer price of labour and ￿ is the speci￿c tax on labour income. The consumers
have no pro￿t income, as we make the common assumption that the government taxes
8We assume that each consumer is endowed with one unit of time. Time not used to supply labour
is consumed as leisure.
9Vector notation: z ￿ z () zj ￿ zj 8 j, z > z () zj ￿ zj 8 j ^ z 6= z, z ￿ z () zj > zj 8 j.
6away all pure pro￿t.10 Under standard assumptions regarding preferences (namely, local
non-satiation and strict convexity), the solution to (2.1) yields each consumer￿ s (net)
commodity demand and labour supply functions:
xi(q;!;g) and li(q;!;g) (2.2)
The production of the n private commodities is undertaken by a single, aggregate,
pro￿t-maximising ￿rm, as there are no aggregation problems on the supply side in the
absence of production externalities (as is assumed). Accordingly, there is no loss in
generality by assuming a single ￿rm. The ￿rm￿ s closed and strictly convex technology
set is denoted by Y ￿ Rn+1. The ￿rm￿ s pro￿t maximisation problem can be stated as:
￿(p;w) = max
x; l
fpx ￿wl j hx;li 2 Yg (2.3)
The ￿rm￿ s pro￿t function is ￿(￿). Application of Hotelling￿ s Theorem to the pro￿t
function yields the ￿rm￿ s output-supply and input-demand functions:
rp￿(￿) = x(p;w) and rw￿(￿) = ￿ l(p;w) (2.4)
where x is the (net) supply vector of private commodities, and l is the ￿rm￿ s demand
for labour.
The government uses commodities and labour to produce the public good according
to the following technology:
g ￿ f(xg;lg) (2.5)
where f (￿) is strictly concave and increasing in all its arguments, and xg and lg denote
the employment of commodities and labour to produce the public good.
10Guesnerie and Jerison [1991] also make this assumption. Alternatively, one could assume that the
production side of the economy is characterized by constant returns to scale, which implies zero pro￿ts
in equilibrium.
7Equilibrium is obtained if and only if:
X
xi(q;!;g) + xg ￿x(p;w) ￿ 0
(n) (2.6)
l(p;w) + lg ￿
X
li(q;!;g) ￿ 0 (2.7)
g ￿f(xg;lg) ￿ 0 (2.8)
The simplicity of the model, as summarised in equations (2.6) ￿(2.8), is re￿ ective of
its generality. In particular, we place no restrictions on the number of commodities or
the forms of the demand and supply functions (although we will assume that they are
di⁄erentiable). Equations (2.6) and (2.7) are market clearing conditions for the n private
commodities and labour. Equation (2.8) requires that the provision of the public good
be technically feasible. It is shown in the Appendix that if all the equations in (2.6)
and (2.7) are satis￿ed as equalities, the government￿ s budget is exactly balanced. But if
some of these equations are satis￿ed as inequalities, the government￿ s budget will be in
surplus. An equilibrium is said to be tight when (2.6) ￿(2.8) are satis￿ed as equalities,
and non-tight when some of these equations are satis￿ed as inequalities.
3 The La⁄er Argument
Consider an arbitrarily given tight equilibrium of our economy,11 where the correspond-
ing tax system may or may not be optimal in any sense of the word. We are interested
in whether a small (modelled as di⁄erential) increase in the labour-income tax rate nec-
essarily moves the economy to a neighbouring equilibrium which has a lower level of tax
revenues (holding all other taxes constant). To this end, we de￿ne a policy reform as
a vector dP := hdp, dt, dw, d￿, dg, dxg, dlgi, where the government has direct control
over the taxes t and ￿, as well as over the level (g) and method of production (xg and
lg) of the public good. Changes in these instruments may induce changes in producer
11We always assume that the status quo equilibrium is tight so that the system (2.6) ￿(2.8) can be
di⁄erentiated.
8prices, p and w, according to the equilibrium conditions.12 Speci￿cally, a policy reform
is equilibrium preserving if and only if:
￿ rZdP ￿ 0
(n+2) (3.1)
where rZ is the (n + 2) ￿ (3n + 4) Jacobian matrix (with respect to dP) associated































where all derivatives are evaluated in the status quo equilibrium.








The average (and marginal) labour-income tax rate is ￿=w. Thus, the set of policy
reforms that include an increase in the labour-income tax rate are those that satisfy:
h
0(n) 0(n) ￿1 1 0 0(n) 0
i
dP > 0 (3.3)
At this point it is important to mention that, following convention, we have speci￿ed
taxes in the model in terms of speci￿c taxes rather than tax rates. This is purely a
standard modelling convenience.13 We also hold the speci￿c commodity taxes, rather
12More formally, dP gives the government 3n + 4 instruments, but it must satisfy the n + 2 equi-
librium equations in (2.6) ￿(2.8). This suggests by the Implicit Function Theorem 2n + 2 degrees
of freedom in picking tight equilibria in the neighbourhood of the status quo equilibrium. There are
only 2n degrees of freedom, however, as two degrees of freedom are lost due to the consumers￿demand
and supply functions being homogenous of degree zero in consumer prices, and the ￿rm￿ s supply and
demand functions being homogenous of degree zero in producer prices. But intuitively there are more
than 2n degrees of freedom, because we also allow the economy to move from a tight equilibrium to a
non-tight equilibrium. See chapter 2 in Guesnerie [1995] for a detailed discussion of these issues.
13For a recent exposition and discussion of the analytical equivalence between speci￿c taxes and tax
9than commodity tax rates, constant for simplicity. We consider an increase in the labour-
income tax rate, rather than in the speci￿c tax on labour, only because discussions of
labour taxation vis-￿-vis the La⁄er argument are almost always in terms of the labour-
income tax rate. None of our results would change if we worked entirely in terms of
speci￿c taxes or tax rates, although some of the equations in Lemma 1 (below) would
change slightly.
The set of policy reforms that do not include a decrease in the level of the public
good are those that satisfy:
h
0(n) 0(n) 0 0 1 0(n) 0
i
dP ￿ 0 (3.4)
Suppose there does not exist a policy reform that satis￿es (3.1) ￿(3.4). Then all
policy reforms that satisfy (3.1) ￿(3.3) must violate (3.4). That is, all policy reforms
that are equilibrium preserving, that involve no changes in the commodity taxes, and
that involve an increase in the labour-income tax rate, must also involve a lower level of
the public good. Given that the government is free to change the combination of inputs
xg and lg in order to minimise the cost of producing the public good, the lower level
of the public good must necessarily be the result of lower tax revenues accruing to the
government. Put another way, if there does not exist a policy reform that satis￿es (3.1)
￿(3.4), then all equilibria in the neighbourhood of the status quo equilibrium that are
attainable by an increase in the labour-income tax rate necessarily involve a lower level
of tax revenues than does the status quo equilibrium. Therefore, an economy in which
there does not exist a policy reform that satis￿es (3.1) ￿(3.4) can be interpreted as
an economy in which an equilibrium-preserving increase in the labour-income tax rate
necessarily results in lower tax revenues, i.e., the La⁄er e⁄ect. Such an economy could
be interpreted as being situated on the prohibitive segment of the La⁄er curve, although,
strictly speaking, this is not correct since we have not derived a La⁄er curve.
By Motzkin￿ s Theorem,14 there does not exist a policy reform dP that satis￿es (3.1)
rates, see Blackorby and Murty [2007].
14See the Appendix for a statement of this theorem.














0(n) 0(n) 0 0 1 0(n) 0
i
= ￿rZ (3.5)
The system of equations in (3.5) characterises what the economy must ￿ look like￿for it
to be subject to the La⁄er e⁄ect. Expanding (3.5) yields the following lemma:
Lemma 1 Consider any tight equilibrium of our economy. An increase in the labour-
income tax rate necessarily results in lower tax revenues if and only if there exist real






































rgli + ￿n+2 (3.10)
0
(n) = h￿1;:::;￿ni ￿ ￿n+2rxgf (3.11)
0 = ￿n+1 ￿ ￿n+2rlgf (3.12)
where all derivatives are evaluated in the status quo equilibrium.
It is worth mentioning that Lemma 1 provides a theoretical foundation for an em-
pirical investigation into the possibility of the La⁄er e⁄ect in real economies. Indeed, it
is often argued, e.g., by Fleurbaey [2006], that criteria such as that in Lemma 1 are of
more value to policy-makers than theoretical descriptions of optimal tax systems. The
information requirements of (3.6) ￿(3.9) are estimates of aggregate demand and supply
price derivatives (or elasticities) for the commodities and labour. In principle, these can
be estimated using market data and econometric techniques. Equation (3.10) requires
estimates of how commodity demand and labour supply vary with the level of the public
11good. If such estimates are unavailable, a standard separability assumption on prefer-
ences could be made to ensure that rgxi(￿) = 0(n) and rgli(￿) = 0.15 Equations (3.11)
and (3.12) require estimates of the marginal productivities of commodities and labour in
producing the public good, which in principle can also be estimated. Once such data are
obtained, the task then would be to check (say with a computer) whether the Lemma
1 conditions can be satis￿ed. A simple numerical example of an economy that satis￿es
(3.6) ￿(3.12) is provided in the next section.
From Lemma 1 we obtain the following results (all proofs are in the Appendix):
Theorem 1 Consider a tight equilibrium of our economy in which the tax system is
Pareto e¢ cient. In such an economy, an increase in the labour-income tax rate cannot
result in the La⁄er e⁄ect.
Theorem 1 provides formal support￿ albeit indirectly￿ for the intuition that it is not
optimal for a government to operate on the prohibitive segment of the La⁄er curve.16
An optimal tax system (which we take to satisfy the minimum condition of Pareto
optimality) is necessarily characterised by the marginal bene￿t of a change in each tax
being equated to its marginal cost. For example, a tax decrease which reduces the
consumer price of some good will boost consumption of that good and welfare. This
is the bene￿t. The cost is that the increase in demand must be met by an increase in
supply by transferring resources from other sectors of the economy. Theorem 1 implies
that the tax system of an economy subject to the La⁄er e⁄ect cannot be characterised
by the condition that marginal bene￿t equals marginal cost for each tax.17 In particular,
the labour-income tax rate is ￿ too high￿in the following sense:
Theorem 2 In an economy subject to the La⁄er e⁄ect, the labour-income tax rate is at
the highest level consistent with the status quo levels of the commodity taxes and public
good, and satisfaction of (2.6) ￿(2.8) such that the equilibrium is tight.
15Recall that Guesnerie and Jerison [1991] maintain such a separability assumption throughout their
paper.
16Although in models of tax competition this intuition may not hold. See Hindriks [2001] and Keen
and Kotsogiannis [2003].
17Of course, if the status quo tax system were optimal, there would be no reason for the government
to increase the labour-income tax rate. The question of the La⁄er e⁄ect is, however, a positive question,
rather than a normative question.
12In other words, the economy looks as if the government has chosen the highest
possible labour-income tax rate, subject to the equilibrium constraints, t = b t, and g =
b g, where b t and b g denote the status quo levels of the commodity taxes and public good.
Theorem 2 tells us that out of the entire set of tight equilibria with commodity taxes
equal to b t and the public good equal to b g, the equilibrium with the highest labour-income
tax rate is the one in which the La⁄er e⁄ect would occur. Such an equilibrium cannot
be Pareto e¢ cient, as any other equilibrium within this set of equilibria would be Pareto
superior.
Theorem 3 In an economy subject to the La⁄er e⁄ect, the labour supply response to a











where all derivatives are evaluated in the status quo equilibrium.
The ratio rxgf(￿)=rlgf(￿) is a vector of technical rates of substitution of each com-
modity for labour in production of the public good. Theorem 3 states that the La⁄er
e⁄ect requires that the labour supply response to an increase in the consumer wage,
valued at the marginal product of labour in public good production, must be greater
than the commodity demand response to an increase in the consumer wage, valued at
the marginal products of commodities in public good production. The marginal pro-
ductivities in public good production are used to put the labour supply response and
commodity demand response in comparable units.
Theorem 3 provides formal support for the popular thinking that labour supply
must be ￿ very sensitive￿to changes in wages in order for La⁄er-like phenomena to occur.
To interpret Theorem 3, consider ￿rst the e⁄ect of an increase in the labour-income
tax rate on commodity demand. Suppose the aggregate value of commodity demand
is increasing in the consumer wage, i.e., rxgf(￿)
X
r!xi(￿) > 0.18 An increase in
the labour-income tax rate (which reduces the consumer wage) causes a decrease in the
demand for commodities. All else equal, this results in excess supply of the commodities,
18This condition can be assumed to hold in almost all economies, unless there are ￿ too many￿inferior
goods.
13with a corresponding shift in the government￿ s budget from balance to surplus.19 Now
consider labour supply. Standard results in consumer theory ensure that the substitution
e⁄ect of an increase in the labour-income tax rate is negative, and if leisure is a normal
good the income e⁄ect is positive. If the substitution e⁄ect dominates, an increase
in the labour-income tax rate reduces labour supply and, all else equal, creates excess
demand in the labour market, with a corresponding shift in the government￿ s budget
from balance to de￿cit. Therefore, put simply, the La⁄er e⁄ect requires that an increase
in the labour-income tax rate reduce labour supply by more than it reduces commodity
demand, so that the net e⁄ect is for the government￿ s budget to move from balance to
de￿cit. With public good production held constant, the move from balance to de￿cit is
explained by lower tax revenues, i.e., the La⁄er e⁄ect. The government must, however,
reduce public good production to correspond to the lower level of tax revenues, in order
to restore budget balance.
4 A Numerical Example
In order to illustrate the empirical applicability of Lemma 1, we present a simple example
of an economy in which an increase in the labour-income tax rate would result in the
La⁄er e⁄ect. The economy has two commodities (n = 2) and k consumers.20 The key
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19Recall that in a tight equilibrium the government￿ s budget is balanced, and in a non-tight equilib-
rium the government￿ s budget is in surplus.
20It does not matter how many consumers (and for that matter producers) there are, because the
information requirements of Lemma 1 are in terms of aggregate demand and supply derivatives.
14By Lemma 1, there does not exist a policy reform dP such that:













0(2) 0(2) 0 0 1 0(2) 0
i
dP ￿ 0













0(2) 0(2) 0 0 1 0(2) 0
i
= ￿rZ




4i; ￿ = h￿ 1
4, ￿ 1
4i, ￿ = 1, and ￿ = 1
4 satisfy the
required conditions.
It should be noted that there is nothing especially unusual about the economy de-
scribed in rZ. For example, the aggregate demand and supply derivatives satisfy the
appropriate signs. For simplicity we have assumed that demand for each commodity is
dependent upon only its own price. (This would be true, for example, if the consumers￿
preferences were Cobb-Douglas.) We have also implicitly assumed that commodities
and labour are separable from the public good in the consumers￿utility functions. This
ensures that rgxi(￿) = 0(2) and that rgli(￿) = 0 for all i. The only unusual feature of
the economy is that
X
r!li(￿) > 0 is relatively large, as re￿ ected in the large (absolute)
values of ￿ 4 and 3 in columns ￿ve and six of rZ. As popular thinking and Theorem 3
suggest, a necessary condition for the La⁄er e⁄ect is that labour supply be very sensitive
to wage changes. We also know that the labour-income tax rate is ￿ too high￿relative to
its Pareto-e¢ cient level (Theorem 2), but this is not observable in the data required by
Lemma 1.
155 Concluding Comments
In this paper we have characterised the conditions under which an increase in the labour-
income tax rate necessarily results in lower tax revenues, but we have not attempted to
characterise when a decrease in the labour-income tax rate increases tax revenues. At
￿rst thought one might expect that the analysis could simply be reversed, in that it is
characterised when a decrease in the labour-income tax rate requires an increase in the
public good. However, this cannot be interpreted as the generation of extra tax revenues.
An increase in the public good could be obtained with the same, or even lower, level of
tax revenues if the status quo method of producing the public good were ine¢ cient. For
this reason, our analysis considers only when an increase in the labour-income tax rate
can necessarily result in lower tax revenues.
Nevertheless, we believe our model and methodology provide important insights into
the La⁄er argument. While the existing literature has focused on the shape of the La⁄er
curve, we have analysed the La⁄er argument directly by taking a tax reform approach.
Moreover, we can examine the La⁄er argument in a very general setting, which ensures
that our results are valid for all well-behaved classes of preferences and technologies.
This also makes our characterisation result (Lemma 1) directly applicable to empirical
testing. Such characterisations are often argued to be of more use to governments than,
say, optimal tax recommendations, as political constraints typically make it impossible
for the government to implement the large tax changes required to reach an optimum.
We have also obtained a number of speci￿c results that provide formal support for the
intuition that the La⁄er e⁄ect requires an economy with a ￿ high￿labour-income tax rate
and a labour-supply response that is ￿ very sensitive￿to wage changes. Finally, although
we have not derived a La⁄er curve, our analysis supports the intuition that it is not
optimal for a government to operate on the prohibitive segment of the La⁄er curve.
6 Appendix
The Government￿ s Budget
16The government￿ s budget surplus BS can be written as:
BS =
X
(q ￿ p)xi +
X
(w ￿ !)li + ￿(p;w) ￿pxg ￿wlg (A.1)
where the ￿rst term represents receipts from commodity taxation, the second term is
receipts from taxing labour, the third term is from the total taxation of pure pro￿ts, and
the last two terms represent the government￿ s expenditures on commodities and labour
to produce the public good. Rewriting the pro￿ts term in (A.1) yields:
BS =
X
(q ￿ p)xi +
X
(w ￿ !)li + px ￿wl ￿pxg ￿wlg (A.2)
Under the assumption of local non-satiation, the consumers will satisfy their budget





li + px ￿wl ￿pxg ￿wlg (A.3)
Rearranging (A.3) yields:




li ￿lg ￿l) (A.4)
Market clearing requires that the terms in parentheses in (A.4) be non-negative. Thus,
the government￿ s budget is exactly balanced in a tight equilibrium, and the government￿ s
budget is in surplus in a non-tight equilibrium.
Motzkin￿ s Theorem of the Alternative
Let A, C, and D be n1 ￿ m, n2 ￿ m, and n3 ￿ m matrices, respectively, where A is
non-vacuous (not all zeros). Then either
Az ￿ 0
(n1) Cz ￿ 0
(n2) Dz = 0
(n3)
has a solution z 2 Rm, or
y1A + y2C + y3D = 0
(m)
17has a solution y1 > 0(n1), y2 ￿ 0(n2), and y3 sign unrestricted, but never both. A proof of
Motzkin￿ s Theorem can be found in Mangasarian [1969].
Proof of Theorem 1
Step 1: We ￿rst derive the equations that implicitly characterise a Pareto-e¢ cient tax
system. A policy reform increases the welfare of consumer i if and only if dVi(￿) = rVidP
> 0, where rVi is the gradient of consumer i￿ s indirect utility function with respect to
dP, i.e., rVi := hrqVi, rqVi, r!Vi, ￿ r!Vi, rgVi, 0(n); 0i. Starting in an initial tight
equilibrium, if there does not exist a policy reform that is equilibrium preserving and
Pareto improving, then the status quo equilibrium is Pareto e¢ cient. Let rV be the
k ￿ (3n + 4) matrix formed by the vectors rVi. By Motzkin￿ s Theorem, if there does
not exist a policy reform dP such that ￿ rZdP ￿ 0(n+2) and rV dP ￿ 0(k), then there
exist two vectors of real numbers ￿ > 0(k) and ￿ ￿ 0(n+2) such that:
￿rV = ￿rZ (A.5)












































rgli + ￿n+2 (A.10)
0
(n) = h￿1;:::;￿ni ￿ ￿n+2rxgf (A.11)
0 = ￿n+1 ￿ ￿n+2rlgf (A.12)
where all derivatives are evaluated in the status quo equilibrium. Equations (A.6) ￿
(A.12) can be interpreted as the ￿rst-order conditions for a Pareto optimum. Each num-
18ber ￿i can be interpreted as the welfare weight of consumer i, and the vector h￿1;:::;￿n+2i
can be interpreted as the multipliers attached to the n + 2 equilibrium constraints in
(2.6) ￿(2.8). That is, if the government were to choose its policy instruments to max-
imise a Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function W(V1, V2, ..., Vk) subject to (2.6) ￿
(2.8), then ￿i = @W(￿)=@Vi and h￿1;:::;￿n+2i is the vector of multipliers attached to the
n + 2 constraints in (2.6) ￿(2.8).
Step 2: We show that there does not exist an equilibrium of our economy in which
(3.6) ￿(3.12) and (A.6) ￿(A.12) can be satis￿ed simultaneously. Suppose ￿n+2 = 0.
Then from (3.11) and (3.12) we have h￿1;:::;￿ni = 0(n) and ￿n+1 = 0. Then from (3.9)









Suppose ￿n+2 = 0. Then from (A.11) and (A.12) we have h￿1;:::;￿ni = 0(n) and ￿n+1
= 0. Then from (A.10) we have
X
￿irgVi = 0 which is a contradiction. Hence ￿n+2 >








Let ￿ := ￿n+2=￿n+2. From (A.13) and (A.14) we have h￿1;:::;￿ni = ￿h￿1;:::;￿ni and








The right-hand sides of (A.15) and (A.9) are identical, but the left-hand side of (A.15)
is positive while the left-hand side of (A.9) is non-positive, yielding a contradiction. ￿
Proof of Theorem 2
Consider the following hypothetical maximisation problem. Choose p, t, w, ￿, g, xg, and
lg to maximise ￿(￿￿w) subject to (i) t = b t, (ii) g = b g, and (iii) the equilibrium conditions
(2.6) ￿(2.8), where ￿ > 0 and b t and b g denote the status quo levels of the commodity
taxes and public good. Let ￿ = h￿1;:::;￿ni denote the multipliers on constraint (i), let ￿
19denote the multiplier on constraint (ii), and let ￿ = h￿1;:::;￿n+2i denote the multipliers
on constraint (iii). The Lagrangian can be written as:
L(￿) = ￿(￿ ￿ w) + ￿(t ￿ b t) + ￿(g ￿ b g) ￿ h￿1;:::;￿ni
hX








￿ ￿n+2 [g ￿f(xg;lg)]
The ￿rst-order conditions on p, t, w, ￿, g, xg, and lg are identical to equations (3.6)
￿(3.12), respectively. Therefore, an economy that is subject to the La⁄er e⁄ect is an
economy that ￿ looks like￿the government has attempted to maximise the labour-income
tax rate, subject to the equilibrium constraints, t = b t, and g = b g. ￿
Proof of Theorem 3





r!li > 0 (A.16)








r!li > 0 (A.17)





r!li > 0 (A.18)
Rearranging (A.18) completes the proof. ￿
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